I CANNOT tell you how much I appreciate the honour that the Committee has done me in its invitation to give the Robert Campbell Memorial Oration. I feel especially proud as I have had the honour, the privilege, and the pleasure not only of being one of his old students, but also of serving under him as a resident pupil and as a house surgeon in the Royal Victoria Hospital.
Before I aeal with my subject-"Malaria in War," I must say a few words on a text that Kipling has modified from the Scriptures-"Let us now praise famous men, for their work continueth, greater than their knowing."
We are gathered here to-night to keep alive the memory of a famous man, Mr. Robert Campbell, whose work continueth greater than he in his modesty would ever have anticipated. I see here to-night many of his old colleagues and students who must have felt the stimulus of his example and teaching as I did.
As a teacher I have known few to equal Robert Campbell. He explained his theses with the simplicity, lucidity, and logic that mark the born and inspired teacher. He showed that he had his subject at his fingertips, both mentally and practically. He taught one not to accept what at first sight appeared to be an obvious and simple diagnosis, without first fully weighing the pros and cons of other possibilities. I think it was he who first laid the foundation in my mind for the acceptance of that great principle in research work: "Never take authority when you can get fact, and never guess when you can know." He taught one to be critical, and more especially of one's own work.
His technique as a surgeon was a delight to watch, and I fortunately had many opportunities of observing it at close quarters. He was no mere carpenter, but a surgeon in the very best and widest meaning of that term-a surgeon must-be a clinician first. The greatest benefit of his patients was always his aim. As a result his patients had unbounded confidence in him.
He was a faithful friend, a wise counsellor, and an ever-present help in time of need. I wish I was more worthy of paying a suitable tribute to his memory and to that greatness which he never advertised. It is only right that his memory should be kept green by the Belfast Medical School, for which he did so much.
GENERAL INCIDENCE OF MALARIA IN WAR.
The majority of diseases that affect armies are preventable, and a study of past campaigns has shown that many more men are disabled by sickness than by enemy action. Instances-have occurred where whole armies have been incapacitated by disease, even before reaching the scene of operations. Expeditions have had to be abandoned owing to the ravages of disease. During the First World War, the ratio of battle casualties to sick admissions was 1 to 1.3 in Flanders, while in Egypt and Palestine it was about 1 to 10, in Mesopotamia 1 to 13, in 'Macedonia 1 to 27, and in East Africa 1 to 33.
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As can be seen from these figures, the ratio rises very rapidly when the tropics or the subtropics are the scenes of operations. This increase is caused partly by the fact that continuous pitched battles occur more commonly in the temperate zones, but mainly because in the tropics-' (i) Disease is more prevalent;
(ii`) European troops have had no opportunity of developing any immunity to many unfamiliar diseases, and (iii) The local conditions are more suitable for the spread of disease, and these are greatly increased by war. In such theatres, malaria and dysentery are the two commonest causes of morbidity, and of these malaria is the most devastating.
Nowadays, the importance of malaria in war does not lie in the number-of deaths caused (usually in the past considerably less than one per cent. of the case-incidence). It is in the widespread debility, both physical and mental, that it produces with resultant enormous loss of fighting strength, of efficiency, and sometimes of morale.
It is evident that all such tropical campaigns are from the first sanitary ones. It is just as necessary to prevent needless casualties from disease as from enemy action An army is mobilised to go to battle, not to hospital. It has been proved by experience gained in many previous campaigns (vide infra) that not only may the speed of operations be very greatly delayed by the effects of malaria, but in prolonged ones the wastage of manpower produced by this disease alone may be a decisive factor in preventing a successful outcome.
Field Marshal Smuts stated that the East Africa campaign of 1915-18 was "one against nature in which climate, geography and disease fought more effectively against us than the well-trained forces of the enemy." This is equally applicable to the recent campaigns in South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific. Climate and geography were so favourable to the spread of malaria that in those theatres this disease, and not the Japanese, was recognised as "Enemy No. 1." In the earlv days it caused many times as many casualties as the enemy's land, air and sea forces combined.
There is a large amount of conclusive evidence to show that malaria has had a remarkably adverse effect on military operations from the earliest times, and so has changed the history of the world.
Cardamatis, the Greek malariologist, presumes that the disease which attacked the Greeks before Troy about 1500 B.C. was malaria due to t'he swampy nature of the ground.
When the "Assyrian came down like a wolf on the fold," they had first to traverse the very malarious Jordan valley before attacking Jerusalem (c. 700 B.C.). Genovese thinks that "the Angel of Death" which smote Sennacherib's host was malaria contracted in that valley.1
Although there may be some uncertainty about the validity of the contention that malaria was introduced into Italy by the Punic invasions about 200 B.C., there is little doubt that both the Carthegenean and the Roruan armies had enormous casualties from this disease. During the Civil Wars in Italy the health of Caesar's army was broken by malaria (Celli, 1933) .2 Tacitus reported that Gallic and Germanic troops (non-immunes) suffered severely through camping in the unhealthy environs of the Vatican Hill. Repeatedly northern barbarians-Goths, Huns, and Lombards-who attacked and despoiled Rome, were decimated through the agency of malaria (Hoops, 1934) .
Jones (1909) has written a book to show how the decadence of the Greeks, in both their military and cultural spheres, was brought about by malaria.
Malaria took a heavy toll of the Crusaders in Palestine. The armies of Salah ed Din and Richard Cceur de Lion are said to have suffered severely from "fever," while facing each other in the Birket Ramadan swamps on the Palestinian coast.3 Apparently an armistice had to be declared for this reason (Vickers, 1942) .
In 1167, the finest army ever commanded by Frederick Barbarossa was decimated in the Roman Campagna by this disease. "Obscure soldiers, nobles and illustrious prelates laid down their lives there. The flower of a nation was exterminated" (Balfour, 1924) .
The great military surgeon, Pringle, describes the intense malaria prevailing in the British army in Flanders during Marlborough's campaigns, and in Scotland before and after the Battle of Culloden (Hoops, 1934) .4
To come to more recent times, when Napoleon set out for Egypt in 1798 with the best army of France, a successful campaign would probably have changed the history of the world. His army, camped near Acre, became riddled with malaria and plag'ue. Our fleet prevented him getting reinforcements of healthy troops, and his grandiose eastern scheme was frustrated.5
In our wars with the Dutch in Java. about 1800, the personnel of the fleet engaged there were so stricken by this disease that Edam was described as a "regular charnel house."16
The ill-fated Walcheren expedition of 1809 to the Lowlands is often quoted as a striking example of the devastating effects of malaria. Some more recent investigations cast grave doubt upon the malarial causation of this catasfrophe (Swellengrebel and de Buck, 1938) .
In the Rangoon Expedition of 1824-25, only 35 deaths were due to wounds, while 450 out of every 1,000 engaged died of malaria. The Arakan Expedition of 1826 had to be abandoned owing to this fever: "Everyone who was not dead was in hospital"!! Our troops in the Crimean War also suffered severely from malaria. Macdonald (1923) points out that some of this force occupied practically the same position as the Macedonian Expeditionary Force did in the First World War, and were affected by malaria to the same extent (vide infra).
"In August 1851, from being in extraordinarily fit condition in the previous months, the armies of the Balkan P-eninsula were suddenly prostrated by disease. Apart from the hospital sick, it was universally admitted that no man in the ranks, though not on the sick list, was capable of active field service." Malaria was the chief cause of sickness in the Chino-Japanese war of 1894-5. In the Ashanti Expedition of 1896, there were in six months 1,491 admissions to hospital for malaria in a force of about 5,000, with a sick rate of 40 per cent. among the officers.
It might possibly he said that most of these examples are relatively old history, occurring before the discovery of the mosquito carriage of malaria, and many before the value of quinine was fully recognised or adequate supplies available. Unfortunately many similar disasters were reported during the first World War.7
In that war, malaria had a most important adverse influence on almost all fronts except Flanders. In tropical and sub-tropical theatres, it caused more casualties than any other single factor; the mass debility produced exceeded by far the losses from any other cause. It was responsible for from three to ten times more casualties than enemy action. Indeed, in East Africa the ratio was as high as twenty times.
In Before entering into the details of any scheme for the control of malaria in war, it is necessary to summarise briefly the various factors involved. These include the human host, the malaria parasite, and the anopheline mosquito. They may be visualised as a series of beads joined by links to form a chain with side-chains, which may be endless in nature.
Their relationships are shown graphically in 'Fable I, from which it can be seen that the links connecting the two animal hosts of the parasite, man and mosquito, are the bites of anopheline mosquitoes. This is the only way the disease can be conveyed in nature. It is evident, therefore, that theoretically the prevention of the spread of malaria is simple-the prevention of the bites of infected mosquitoes.
But, as Napoleon has said about war: "TIhe principles are simple, the difficulties lie in their execution."
In war the immediate object is to conserve man-power by keeping men fit until the operations are ended; the morbid effects of disease that may develop at a later date are of less urgency. Therefore, any scheme for the control of the malaria menace in war contains two main factors-(a) the prevention or diminution in the transmission of infection, and (b) The measures used may be either chemical or mecqhanical.
(a) Chemical Protection against Mosquito Bites.
These consist of the application of creams or lotions, mainly to the exposed portions of the body, to repel the mosquito or otherwise deter it from biting. Many substances had been used in the past. Citronella was the chief ingredient employed in such preparations both in the first World War and in the interval of peace which followed it. Unfortunately, this substance was not one-hundred-per-cent. efficient, especially in the presence of intenrse anophelism. This fact, combined with the greasy nature of the standard preparations, made it very unpopular, so its use was difficult to enforce among troops.
Early in 1943, a vanishing cream containing pyrethrum was devised in the Middle East Force. This was a great improvement. At the same time teams of expert workers both in the United Kingdom and America had been engaged in intensive research to find a better repellent. As a result of the trial of many hundreds of compounds, a very effective substance was found-dimethyl phthalate (now usually known as DMP). This substancie is used alone in the British Army, but the American preparations are reinforced with two other good repellents-indalone and Rutger's 612. DMP was a standard issue to all troops in malarious areas during the last years of the war. It was very effective.
The lasting duration of an application of DMP is, however, only about two to three hours at most. This means that in those circumstances where troops cannot use mosquito nets, they would have to be awakened every few hours to reapply their repellent. This is not a practical pfoposition. It was found, however, that head veils made of wide-mesh (three-eighth inch) netting, when impregnated with DMP would retain their protective properties during the night hours. Arrangements were being made for a very-extensive issue of these when peace was declared. They will presumably be used by our troops garrisoning malarious regions in the tropics in future. Clothing.-The more the body is covered by clothing the less chance has a mosquito to bite. The shorts and short-sleeved shirts which were worn by troops in warm climates during the early stages of the war gave little protection against mosquito bites after dusk, especially when combined with the relatively poor qualities of the Citronella ointment. In theory the troops were supposed to change into tunics and trousers before dusk, but under many active-service conditions this was impossible or not carried out. After a prolonged campaign by the Medical Services, the latter type of uniform was accepted as the standard for active service conditioiqs in most parts of the tropics, and shorts were forbidden except for games. Anti-mosquito Veils and. Gloves.-Veils of mosquito netting and canvas gloves were an original issue to our troops, to protect them from mosquito bites when not covered by a net. The smallness of the mesh needed to ensure protection, made the veils so stuffy, and so diminished visual acuity, that they were seldom properly used. The gloves were also hot and difficult to work with. The provision of DMP-impregnated wide-mesh veils and gloves had none of these objections. In addition they afford much protection for personnel sleeping without nets.
Arrangements were being made to supply such veils and gauntlets when the war stopped.
(II) COLLECTIVE PROTECTION. In fixed camps and bases, the screening of quarters, hospitals, etc., was advocated. This measure was largely employed by the American troops, very many of whom were already "screen-conscious" before entering the army. Unfortunately it was never extensively used by the British forces, partly because of personal objections to being "shut in a meat safe," and partly because of shortage of appropriate materials.
II. REDUCTION IN THE NUMBERS OF MOSQUITOES.
The chances of being bitten by an infected insect can be greatly reduced either-(a) by avoiding, when possible, places where such insects are prevalent (environmental measures), or (b) by reducing the number of mosquitoes in the vicinity of one's enforced habitat (anti-mosquito measures). These consist in avoiding, where possible, such situations and times in which infected bites are likely to be received.
(i) Avoidance of Malarious Situations.-Napoleon said that "the choice of a healthy camp site is one of the first of all military considerations.". This is equally true to-day, and is especially true in regard to malaria.
In the selection of such sites, it is not only necessary to avoid the vicinity of mosquito-breeding places, but also the habitations of malarious persons from whom the mosquitoes can acquire infections.
In actual contact with the enemy, this may not always be possible. Nevertheless the selection of healthy sites, or those which can rapidly be made healthy by antimosquito measures, is one of the most important means of protection against malaria.
This method was widely used in the Syrian campaign and the occupation of 1941-43, with most excellent results.9 As the troops advanced, detailed malarial surveys were rapidly made, and maps prepared showing the best positions for camp sites. These were widely issued within a few days to all commands, and the routine orders were also that a medical officer (a malaria expert when possible) should be consulted in the selection of new camp sites, especially those fo* large camps or installations. This was possible because the distribution of malaria was patchy.
On the other hand in Burma and Assam, the physiography of the terrain and strategic reasons usually made this well nigh impossible. All the country was highly malarious, and more especially the camp sites necessitated by strategic reasons. However, as the result of many months of strenuous labour, many relatively healthy "harbours" were made by monumental works of drainage (hundreds of miles) and anti-mosquito measures.
In the highly malarious South-West Pacific zone, this was easier because the scattered and sparse nature of the local population reduced the number of infected insects in spite of the great anopheline prevalence. Unfortunately, when the troops themselves became infected in large numbers, 'they acted as their own reservoirs of infection until their infectivity was very greatly reduced by suppressive drug treatment (vide infra).
In the campaigns in Italy and Sicily, it was said that the enemy purposely attempted to use malaria as an ally. While occupying the more healthy and defensible hill areas, they attempted to confine our forces to the highly malarious plains and marshy areas. They hoped that, as in Macedonia in 1916-18, our troops would be rendered hors de combat by malaria, and so be easily defeated by their healthier troops.
(ii) Avoidance of Malarious Times and Seasons.-As the mosquito is mainly nocturnal in its habits, practically all infections are acquired after dusk. For this reason, the minimum number of troops possible should be kept in dangerous areas at night. The vicinity of villages, which usually harbour fnany infected mosquitoes, should therefore be avoided after dusk. When this is not possible, the very strictest measures of personal protection against bites should be used. The chances of being bitten by an infective mosquito can also be reduced by causing a diminution in the number of dangerous mosquitoes, by attacks upon them in either the adult or the immature stages of their lives.
(1) ANTI-ADULT MEASURES.
During the 1914-18 War, the chief methods available against adult insects were swatting and fumigation. Neither of these was very effective in practice.
In the interval between the wars, great advances were made in mosquito control by the use of insecticidal spraying solutions. The most effective ingredient of these was pyrethrum. Very fine results were achieved by this method against mosquitoes which harbour in house during the daytime. It was, therefore, considered as one of the chief anti-mosquito measures when the present war started, being much more rapid in action than were anti-larval measures.
The entry of Japan into the war very greatly reduced the available supplies of pyrethrum, although much was grown in Kenya. It, therefore, became a matter of extreme urgency to augment and replace the available supplies. With this object in view, very extensive researches were undertaken in both America and many parts of the British Empire. Eventually it was discovered that a substancedichloro-diphenyl-trichlorcethane (commonly called DDT)-had unique insecticidal properties. It was lethal in very small doses not only to adult mosquitoes but also to larvae.
Although slower in its action than pyrethrum preparations, it was more deadly. It also possessed another very important additional property, in that surfaces spread with solutions retained their lethal character for long periods-in some circumstances even for months.
Unfortunately there are a number of dangerous species of anophelines which do not shelter in houses during the daytime, such as A. minrimus, the most dangerous malaria vector of the South-East Asia region, and A. punctulatus of the SouthWest Pacific zone. Diurnal spraying, therefore, while very effective against species sheltering in houses, tents, etc., durirg the day (e.g., Mediterranean species), had little chance of destroying these insects which made only transient nocturnal visitations to get a blood meal. It is against this type of insect that the residual effect of DDT is so useful. When the interiors of such habitations have been residually sprayed, the chances are very great that at some visit the insects will acquire a lethal dose by alighting even briefly upon some treated surface.
This residual effect was also taken advantage of on a large scale for outdoor work. On the Burma-Assam front, not only were the outsides of habitations sprayed weekly, but the camp area and a ring of about fifty yards around its periphery was also treated. In this way insects which harboured outside habitations during the day, would pick up a lethal dose on their journeys to and from the camp to obtain blood meals.10
In addition, very many large-scale trials were made of spraying of DDT solutions from the air, when large areas had to be protected, which could not be sprayed properly nor quickly from the ground because of physical conditions or enemy 10. Spraying DDT both from the ground and the air is very popular with the troops, as it reduces not only the mosquito population, but also the fly pest, which is usually so very prominent in all tropical campaigns. There is also reason to suppose that it will have a very definite effect in reducing other insect-borne diseases, such as dengue and sandfly fever. 13 action. It was also a rapid method of reducing mosquito prevalence, although probably not so perfect as ground mnethods. The deposited spray acts on both adult and larval mosquitoes. These brilliant results were only obtained after very much laborious and intensive research starting in 1942, and carried out by large numbers of scientific workers in many parts of the British Empire and in the U.S.A., both in the laboratory and in the field. Even yet the potentialities and limitations of this marvellous insecticide have not yet been fully explored. There is no doubt, however, that it has already proved of immense value in malaria control.
To implement the use of this insecticide under field conditions, large numbers of different types of apparatus have been evolved to suit different circumstances.11 This has involved great intensive work, much of which has been carried out in the field by -anti-malarial workers.
(2) ANTI-LARVAL MEASURES.
As the immature stages of mosquitoes can only live and develop in water, the measures against them are all concerned with this element-"No exposed water, no mosquitoes, no malaria."'
The various methods used in an anti-larval campaign are summarised in Table II . (a) Reduction of Exposed Water Edge. Such methods have been widely used, often on a very large scale, to turn unhealthy areas into relatively healthy ones. Very extensive drainage, filling, and canalization works were carried out in the Middle East with great benefit. Similar work was used in North Africa and Italy with good results, as was also the case in the South-West Pacific theatre.
The most extensive works of this nature were those done on the Burma-Assam Frontier. There all sites were very unhealthy, and enormous numbers of troops had to pass through the same bases and camps along hundreds of miles of lines of communication. At the main base at Manipur Road, Assam, about six hundred miles of drains were constructed, and further forward at Palel about two hundred miles, to mention the greatest examples.
Unfortunately much of this work had to be done by manual labour and was necessarily very slow as a result. 
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These are more applicable in hilly areas. Among other places they were used in Syria, Burma, and the South-West Pacific.
The agitation of the water-edge by water transport along some of the canals in Egypt appeared to have an anti-larval action.
(ii) LARVICIDES. The anti-mosquito effects of drainage, etc., take some weeks to become evident. This greatly reduces their usefulness for the large number of relatively temporary camps needed in a war of movement. They must be supplemented by some more rapid anti-larval measure, and here larvicides are used mainly. When the recent war began, the two principal larvicides employed were oil and paris green, but later the discovery of DDT was a great advance.
(1) Oils.-Oil was originally the most widely used larvicide and a very good one.
It required, however, a considerable staff and relatively large amounts of apparatus to apply it, and was unsuitable for some conditions.13 As oil has so many other uses in war, and many valuable oil fields in the East were later lost, the question t)f the conservation of this material became a serious one. Another practical point arose in the Burma campaign, where bulky supplies of oil had'to be conveyed over hundreds of miles of road or flown to the front, when all available transport could have been used for other urgent military supplies. This problem was solved, when by the addition of DDT to the oil, the amounts needed became only about onethirtieth of those previously required.
(2) Paris Green.-This is a copper-arsenic compound which is distributed, usually as a dust, on the surface of the water, where the anopheline larvae ingest it. It is a very useful larvicide used from the ground. It is particularly adapted for spraying from aeroplanes. This method was extensively employed with success in Italy for the treatment of large breeding areas, usually swamps and other inaccessible localities.14 A very valuable practical method of spraying a suspension of paris green in water was used widely in the Middle East theatre against the larvae of A. supe,rpictus, breeding in shallow pebbly streams.
(3) DDT.-Solutions of this insecticide in kerosene oil were found to produce satisfactory results in amounts which would have required thirty times as much unmixed oil. The larvicidal action of the solution was also more rapid. Apart from the saving of transport mentioned previously, this resulted in an enormous saving of labour, and a very great simplification of much of the apparatus needed to supply larvicides. This larvicide only became available in large amounts about the middle of 1944, but the results of its use were soon acclaimed in many theatres.15 (iii) NATURAL ENEMIES. There are certain fish which are highly larvivorous. The chief one is an American fish-Gambusia sp. In a few areas this was used to supplement other methods of larval destruction.
(e) Prevention of Man-made or Anzimal-made Breedinig Places.
The activities of an army in a potentially malarious area are always followed by the formation of new collections of water suitable for the breeding of mosquitoes, and so for an increase of malaria.
The making of roads tends to block natural drainage channels, causing swamps and pools. Mechanical transport, apart from breaching irrigation channels, etc., makes ruts in which water collects.16 Fresh excavations in which water lies are made for various utilitarian purposes (borrow pits, wells, etc.), or are dug for defensive reasons (trenches, dug-outs, etc.), or are produced by enemy action (bomb craters). The results of these human activities often cause great rises in the malaria potential of a locality. The strictest means are needed to stop them, ancd control their results. a The breaching of canals and the destruction of drainage works, especially in Italy by the Germans, caused a great rise in mosquito production. While much of this was probably intended primarily to hinder the progress of tanks or similar weapons, there is considerable reason to suspect that it was also intended to enlist malaria as an ally. Conditions of temperature will influence adversely the development of the parasite in the mosquito, and low humidity may cut the insect's life span so short that the parasite cannot develop up to the infective stage before its host dies. Apart from these natural factors, no practical means are known to kill the infection in the host apart from its death. These natural events determine the occurrence and duration of the malarial transmission season, and, as has been mentioned above, this has been taken advantage of where Fossible.
15. WVlile it must be acknowledged that DDT is a most marvellous insecticide, it is still too early to laud it as the panacea for all malarial ills. Much research has still to be done to determine the best, the safest, the most economical, and the most practicable methods of using it. Often untoward results, wvhich would be of comparatively negligible importance in xvar, would be otherwise in peace-time conditions. DDT kills almost all species of insect with which it comes in contact. Howv this will eventually affect the balance of nature in localities where it is used, has still to be determined. It is quite probable that its indiscriminate use may have harmful effects upon such useful insects as bees or other pollinators of plants, as well as upon insects useful as destroyers of agricultural and horticultural pests.
16. The latter was a serious problem in the South-West Pacific theatre, as such ruts formed ideal breeding-places for the dangerous local vector, A. punctulatus. 17 (a) Measuires Relating to the Suisceptible 1u11man Host.
It is well known that different races, and even different individuals, vary considerably in the intensities of their reactions to malarial infections. This is apart from the grades of severity conditioned by the effects of different species of Plasinodium.
Many aboriginal races, such as Africans, have developed a considerable degree of natural tolerance to malarial infectionis through long ages of consociation with the parasite. When this has been reinforced, as it usually is, by an increased tolerance acquired as the result of continue(d multiple infections in early life, the degree of immunity, to local strainis of parasite at least, may be very high (Sinton, 1939) .
This was one of the reasons for the employment of African troops in the highly malarious tracts of South-East Asia. This (lecision was amply justified, for the malarial morbidity among such troops was relatively small as comparedl with that amoing the non-immutne Europeans, or cven the semi-immune Indians. TIhe Europeans, who had never had any chance of (leveloping either racial or acquired tolerance, suffere(d severely.
The employment of such more tolerant troops has an important place in military medicine. The chemo-therapeutic attack upon malarial parasites in the human host falls into two main groups-(i) Methods to reduce the infectivity of the human host to mosquitoes by destruction or (levitalisation of the sexual parasites, an(l (ii) Methods of attack upon the parasites capable of causing clinical manifestations (i.e., the asexual parasites).
(i) REDUCTION IN THE INFECTIVITY OF THE HUMAN HOST.
To be infective to the mosquito, the human host must carry gametocytes (sexual parasites) in his peripheral blood. There is a (Irug-pamaquin (plasmoquine)-which will destroy these potentially dangerous forms, even when taken in small doses. As the main human reservoirs of infection in war are usually the uncontrollable focal population, the drug could not be widelv used for this purpose. Its use was mainly confined to special circumstances, or it was taken as an adjuvant to other anti-plasmodial therapy to reduce the infectivity of patients suffering from severe attacks of the disease.
The routine use of mepacrine suppressive treatment (vide infra), by keeping at a very low level the number of asexual parasites from which the gametocvtes are (lerived, had a most beneficial indirect effect in lowering infectivitv. rhis was especially the case in the South-West Pacific theatre, where the infected native population was scanty locally, andl where the main reservoir of infection grew eventually to be the troops themselves at one time. The rigid enforcement of mepacrine suppression ha(d a great effect in reducing the infectivitv of these troops.
18
TFhis is one of the reasons why such therapy should always be a routine in highly malarious regions where anophelines are abundant and uncontrolled.
(ii) METHODS OF ATTACK ON THE DISEASE-PRODUCING PARASITES.
These may be roughly divided into three groups (Sinton, 1945) - (1 (2) Curative Methods.
The two main drugs used for this purpose in the recent war were quinine and mepacrine (atebrin; quinacrine).
Quinine has a rapid action in cutting short acute clinical attacks. Given alone, it is probably less certain in producing radical cures in certain infections, and is much more unpleasant to take than mepacrine. Intravenous injections are, however, still the standby in the treatment of pernicious attacks, and have saved large numbers of lives during the war.
In 1939, quinine was the most widely used drug for malaria therapy. It had been the chief therapeutic agent in malaria for over a century. Physicians were familiar witlh its use, and supplies were available to the Allies. On the other hand, our knowledge of the advantages and limitations of the synthetic drug, mepacrine, was still very incomplete, and the bulk of the supply was held by the enemy.
When, however, the Japanese invaded Java, they captured most of the quinine supplies of the world. As a result, the Allies had to find a substitute. Consequently the manufacture of mepacrine was started on an enormous scale in both Great Britain and the U.S.A. This was a blessing in disguise, for the very great experience of the properties of this drug gained in the laboratory, in hospitals, and in the field during the past five years, has shown that for most military purposes mepacrine is much superior to quinine.
In the original daily dosage used (0.3 grm.), mepacrine was slower in its action on clinical manifestations than was quinine. For this reason the original Army standard treatment recommended quinine as the drug of choice during the first 17. A "clinical cure" is merely the abolition of the clinical manifestations of which the patient complains at the time. Unless, however, the infection is eradicated at the same time ("radical cure"), these symptoms may recur at a later date (Sinton, 1945) . few days andl then mepacrine to complete the course.18 When later the dlosage of mepacrine was raised to 0.6 or even 1.0 grm. daily, for the first three days, its action xvas speeded up, and now many physicians use mepacrine only as a clinically curative agent an(l often as a radical one.
The stanclard treatment of malaria has so improved that the Australians in the South-West Pacific theatre report that the case-mortality in uncomplicated cases was only 1 in 3, 000 during 194:3-44. (Fairley, 1943) . This is about one-fifteenth of that recorded in Macedonia during 1916-18. In the case of raclical cures, standard treatments with quinine and mepacrine lasting seven to ten days are effective against the great majority of malignant tertian infections. Mepacrinie is also probably more certain in its effects against this infection andl is certainly more pleasant to take.
In benign tertian infections, however, while numbers of cases are radically curecl by such routine treatment, a large proportion (as high as fifty per cent. is reported) may relapse at a later date.19 When in the field so long as suppressive mepacrine treatment is taken properly, these latent infections seldom or never become evidlent, as they are more easily held in check than are malignant tertian ones.
As (Sinton et al., 1928 (Sinton et al., -1930 It has, however, the disadvantage that it dyes the skin yellow, but this is neither a toxic effect nor a jaundice. 21 With the proper enforcement of suppressive mepacrine a force can maintain itself for many months in the field with a relatively loW malarial incidence. This is possible under conditions where, without it, the disease would put the force out of action within a few weeks. 'The use of suppression must never be considered to justify any relaxation in the enforcement of measures of personal protection against mosquito bites and so against malarial infection. Any negligence of these measures will be shown at a later date by benigl tertian relapses, which may have serious repercussions on ma,n-power.
For all schemes for malaria control in war, one must adopt the axiom of Cromwell-"Neglect no means.1" ANTI-MALARIAL ORGANISATION AND RESEACH. The fine results which were achieved in many theatres were gained by no primrose path, but, as always in malaria control, by "blood and toil, sweat and tears."
The Army formed a special In addition to the field workers, from the early stages of war, numerous expert teams of "back-room boys," mainly civilian, were engaged in researches directed to find new methods for defeating the mosquito and the malaria parasite. These were not only medical men, but enthusiastic scientists of all kinds-entomologists, chemists, physicists, physiologists, engineers, etc. Never in history has so much talent been concentrated upon the control of a single clisease. rhe thanks of the Army and the Empire is due to these too-often forgotten workers.
Those discoveries which appeared promising in the laboratory were immediately tried out in the field by units of the Malaria Organisation or by special teams of 21. The two new anti-malarial drugs (Paludrine, the British one, and SN 7618, the American one) have not this disadvantage. Preliminary reports suggest that these drugs may be even more effective than mepacrine. This, however, requires further confirmation in the field and over a much longer period of time and experience. experts. In this way their importance and(l practicability under field-service conditioins were evaluated. lThe field units, by reporting the practical difficulties or shortcomings of the, methods under test, were able to guide the experimental workers in remedying the defects.
BENEFITlS ARISINGI FROM MALARIA IN WAR. Ihat great physician Osler has said that "If a census were taken among the world's workers on disease, the judgment to be based on the damage to health and direct mortality, the votes would be given to malaria as the greatest single destroyer of the human race." Apart from the destruction of life and health, the national, social, and economic losses caused by this disease are unbelievable (Sinton, 1935 (Sinton, , 1936 .
While the recent war has caused lamentable effects in many countries, there is no doubt that the brilliant advances in malaria control resulting from war conditions, will do much to benefit millions of people and enormous tracts of the globe in the future.22
The recent war has resulted in such a drive into methods for controlling this disease as has never been seen before. The basic researches carried out in the United Kingdom, in the U.S.A., in Australia, in India and other parts of the British Empire, have resulted in what will probably prove to be epoch-making discoveries. From the humanitarian standpoint, these should have far-reaching effects in diminishing the morbidity and mortality from malaria. From the economic aspect, they may make possible to an undreamed-of extent the exploitation of the great natural resources of the tropics for the benefit of all mankind.
Some of the outstanding benefits are:-(a) A tremendous stimulus to all aspects of malaria prevention and control; (b) 
